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Estados Unidos de Norte America 
Branch Reporter 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah* 
1. Company rate and tax base 
In 1986, the corporate tax rate was reduced from 46 per cent to 34 per cent (35 
per cent since 1993 ), but the rate reduction was more than offset by base broad-
ening provisions (e.g. repeal of the investment tax credit and lengthening the 
depreciation schedules). Neither the rate nor the base has changed much since 
then. State corporate taxes vary from state to state but can increase the rate by 
over 5 per cent (taking into account the deductibility of state taxes). However, 
the effective rate paid by many corporations is closer to 20 per cent, due primar-
ily to a variety of tax planning techniques. 
The top individual rate, which was only 28 per cent in 1986, has been 
increased to 38.6 per cent (scheduled to go down to 35 per cent by 2006). Long-
term capital gains of individuals are generally taxed at a rate of 20 per cent. 
2. Nature of the company/shareholder tax system 
The US tax system is classical, i.e. corporate income is taxed to the corporation 
at the corporate rate, and dividends are taxed to shareholders at their rate. This 
can be illustrated by the following example for an individual shareholder at the 
top bracket (ignoring state taxes): 
Company 
Company income 
Company tax (35%) 
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Shareholder income after tax 
60 
40 
For corporate shareholders, this result is mitigated by a dividends received deduc-
tion ranging from 70 per cent to 100 per cent of dividends received. In addition, 
there are many tax-exempt shareholders, such as universities and pension funds. 
The classical system is mitigated somewhat by the preferential rate for capital 
gains of individuals (20 per cent), which generally applies to corporate shares 
held over one year. The effect of the capital gains preference can be illustrated by 
the following example, in which a first shareholder invests 10 in the shares of a 
company and then sells them before a dividend is paid. Note that capital losses 
cannot generally be used to offset dividend income: 1 
Company 
Company income 
Company tax (35%) 
After-tax company income 
First shareholder 
Cost of shares 
Sale price of shares 
Individual's income (capital gain) 
Individual's tax (20%) 
Second shareholder 
Dividend 
Total income from dividend 
Cost of shares 
Sale price of shares 
Loss on sale of shares 
Net shareholder tax (38.6%) 
Result for first shareholder 
Total tax 
Shareholder income after tax 
Result for second shareholder 
Total tax 


















Thus, the first shareholder is significantly better off than if he had received a div-
idend, while the second shareholder is worse off.3 This represents an incentive for 
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This and the following example assume that capital gains reflect retained earnings. Of course, 
capital gains may also reflect other factors such as good will, discovery of natural resources, 
decline in inflation or appreciation in the currency, speculative bubbles, etc. If a company has no 
retained earnings and profits, a distribution may be treated more favorably (as a return of capi-
tal) than realized capital gains. 
Representing 40 in cash from the dividend, minus 65 in capital loss carryover (to be used 
against future capital gains). 
Assuming that the dividend tax is not capitalized into the price of the shares. 
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retentions, and indeed US corporations pay few dividends (preferring to redeem 
shares, which can often qualify for the capital gains rate). However, in the past 
they paid more dividends under the same system, suggesting other factors may 
play a role. The above results also create an incentive to sell shares to tax exempt 
or corporate shareholders, who are not taxed fully on the dividend. 
Note that the above results only apply if the first shareholder has held the 
shares for over a year. If not, he would be taxed on the capital gain at the full 38.6 




Company tax (35%) 
After tax company income 
First shareholder 
Cost of shares 
Sale price of shares 
Individual's income (capital gain) 
Individual's tax (38.6%) 
Second shareholder 
Dividend 
Total income from dividend 
Cost of shares 
Sale price of shares 
Loss on sale of shares 
Net shareholder tax (38.6%) 
Result for first shareholder 
Total tax 
Shareholder income after tax 
Result for second shareholder 
Total tax 


















There are some rules designed to prevent unnecessary retentions (the accumu-
lated earnings tax), although they are not very effective since they depend on a 
showing that the corporation does not need the earnings for a valid business pur-
pose. In addition, the personal holding company rules tax corporations that are 
closely held and have primarily passive income at the top individual rate, but the 
rate difference is small (and scheduled to disappear by 2006). 
Representing 40 in cash from the dividend, minus 65 in capital loss carryover (to be used against 
future capital gains). 
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3. International taxation and company/shareholder 
taxation 
3.1. Dividends - US as the source country 
When a US resident corporation (defined for US tax purposes as any corporation 
incorporated in the US) pays a dividend to a non-resident shareholder, the divi-
dend is generally subject to a 30 per cent withholding tax. US tax treaties typi-
cally reduce the rate to 5 per cent in the case of direct investors and 15 per cent in 
the case of portfolio investors, although the recently signed US-UK tax treaty 
has a O per cent rate for direct investors (defined as holding over 25 per cent in 
most cases). 
If a foreign corporation ( defined as any corporation incorporated outside the 
US) pays a dividend from US source earnings to foreign shareholders, the divi-
dend may in some cases be subject to tax. However, this tax is rarely collected 
and the US routinely waives its right to collect it under tax treaties. On the other 
hand, US branches (permanent establishments) of foreign corporations are sub-
ject to a branch profits tax of 30 per cent (5 per cent under treaties) on the "divi-
dend equivalent amount", which is the amount of taxable profits withdrawn from 
the US in any given tax year. The right to collect the branch profits tax has by 
now been incorporated into most US tax treaties. The branch profits tax, when it 
applies, serves as an effective substitute for taxation of US source dividends paid 
by foreign corporations to foreign shareholders. 
The results of these rules is that in most cases the US collects two levels of tax 
on inbound investment, whether in the form of a subsidiary or in the form of a 
branch. This replicates the tax treatment of domestic investors, although treaty 
rate reductions may result in a significantly lower total rate being levied on for-
eign investors. 
3.2. Dividends - US as the residence country 
Portfolio dividends received by US shareholders from foreign corporations are 
fully taxed. A foreign tax credit is available, subject to limitations, for any with-
holding taxes levied on the dividend by the source country (but not for taxes paid 
by the distributing foreign corporation). 
Direct investments received by US corporate shareholders owning at least 10 
per cent by vote of the shares are taxable (and no dividends received deduction is 
available, unlike a corporate investment in a domestic corporation). However, the 
foreign tax credit is available, subject to limitations, for any foreign withholding 
tax and also for any foreign tax paid by the distributing corporation. The foreign 
tax credit typically eliminates any residual US taxation of foreign source direct 
dividends. 
Thus, portfolio foreign source dividends are subject to tax in the same way as 
dividends from domestic corporations. Direct foreign source dividends are typi-
cally not subject to US tax, like direct domestic source dividends. 
940 
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A few US treaties have in the past sought to obtain for US investors the bene-
fits of imputation tax credits (e.g. the old US-UK treaty), but these are unusual 
and are being phased out. 
3.3. Capital gains - US as the source country 
In general, the US does not tax capital gains of foreign portfolio or direct 
investors in US corporations. The exception is US corporations more than 50 per 
cent of whose value is US real estate. Nor does the US tax capital gains of share-
holders from shares in foreign corporations that derive profits from the US. This 
treatment contrasts with the treatment of domestic investors in US companies, 
who are generally taxable on their capital gains (albeit at a preferential rate). 
3.4. Capital gains - US as the residence country 
Retained earnings of foreign corporations are subject to US taxation under an 
elaborate set of "anti-deferral" rules, which apply to passive income. Direct 
investors holding 10 per cent or more by vote of a CFC are subject to tax on 
deemed dividends on the CFC's "Subpart F income" (generally, passive income 
plus certain types of low-taxed active income). Portfolio investors holding shares 
in a PFIC (a foreign corporation with over 75 per cent passive income or over 50 
per cent passive assets) are taxed either currently on the PFIC's income, or with 
an interest charge on distributions or sales, or on a mark to market basis. 
Capital gains of US resident investors in foreign corporations are taxed on the 
same basis as gains from the sale of shares in domestic corporations (i.e. at the 
preferential 20 per cent rate for long-term individual investors), with a foreign tax 
credit available only if the gain is considered foreign source (which would rarely 
be the case, unless a treaty governs). US tax treaties generally seek to eliminate 
source-based taxation of capital gains. There is no distinction between direct and 
portfolio investment. Generally, therefore, double taxation applies to capital gains 
if the foreign corporation was taxed at source, mitigated by the preferential rate. 
3.5. Circular and conduit situations 
There are no special rules for circular situations. A US shareholder in a foreign 
corporation with a US business will be taxed on dividends and capital gains, and 
the foreign corporation will be subject to both direct corporate tax and branch 
profits tax on its US source profits. A foreign shareholder in a US corporation 
with a foreign business will be subject to withholding tax on dividends (but no 
tax on capital gains), and the corporation will be subject to US tax on its foreign 
earnings. 
3.6. Non-discrimination 
The above rules generally do not discriminate against foreign investors, in com-
parison with the treatment of domestic investors. The one exception is the branch 
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profits tax, but this is justified as a way of equalizing the treatment of foreign 
investors with branches and subsidiaries, and of indirectly taxing the ultimate 
foreign shareholders in the same way US shareholders are taxed (i.e. double tax-
ation). Recent US treaties explicitly permit the tax to be levied. 
4. International tax planning to relieve company/ 
shareholder double taxation 
4.1. Source-country perspective 
A foreign investor in a US corporation can avoid double taxation in a variety of 
ways. Most obviously, since capital gains are generally not subject to US source-
based tax, the foreign investor ( direct or portfolio) can avoid double taxation by 
refraining from dividend distributions and instead selling the shares. Similarly, 
the branch profits tax is most easily avoided by retaining the profits in the US. 
Another common technique used by portfolio investors to avoid US taxation 
of dividends (at 30 per cent or at least 15 per cent) is to enter into a total return 
equity swap with a domestic US investment bank, which in turn purchases the 
underlying shares of a US corporation. When the corporation pays a dividend, 
there is no withholding tax since the dividend is paid to a domestic shareholder. 
The bank reports the dividend as income but takes an offsetting deduction for a 
dividend equivalent amount it pays under the equity swap to the foreign investor. 
Under source rules, the dividend equivalent amount is not subject to withholding 
tax. The IRS is aware of this situation but has done nothing to stop it, perhaps to 
encourage inbound portfolio investment. 
Another technique to avoid taxation of dividends is to substitute interest pay-
ments, which are generally not subject to withholding tax for portfolio investors 
even in the absence of a treaty (and may not be subject to withholding tax under 
treaties to direct investors). For direct investors, this technique is subject to thin 
capitalization limits. 
Finally, it is conceivable that in the future more US tax treaties will be negoti-
ated with a O per cent withholding rate for direct dividends, like the new US-UK 
treaty. 
4.2. Residence-country perspective 
It is difficult to avoid double taxation for US portfolio investors in foreign corpo-
rations. Dividends are taxable in full (subject to the foreign tax credit for with-
holding taxes), and capital gains are also taxable (albeit at a preferential rate for 
long-term individual investors). Direct investors, on the other hand, typically pay 
no US tax on dividends because of the foreign tax credit, although they are fully 
taxable on capital gains. 
Tax planning efforts by direct investors have therefore focused on ensuring 
that the total effective rate of tax (corporate and withholding) in the foreign 
942 
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source country does not exceed the foreign tax credit limitation. This can be 
achieved without triggering CFC inclusions by the use of hybrid entities that are 
treated as corporations for foreign purposes and branches for US purposes. For 
example, in one transaction an operating German subsidiary with high-tax active 
income formed a Luxembourg entity, which was treated as a corporation for Ger-
man and Luxembourg purposes but as a branch under check the box. The Luxem-
bourg entity then lent money to the German corporation, which reduced its 
effective tax rate by making deductible interest payments to Luxembourg (which 
does not tax the interest). For US purposes, the "loan" from a branch was ignored 
and therefore the "interest" did not constitute Subpart F income. Attempts by the 
Treasury to combat such transactions were postponed under pressure from Con-
gress until 2006. 
5. Discussion and suggestions 
Historically, there have been three reasons for countries to adopt corporate/share-
holder integration: 
(a) Under the classical system, there is a bias to conduct business in non-corpo-
rate forms, since they are not subject to double taxation (although this is 
mitigated if the individual rate exceeds the corporate rate, since in corporate 
form the individual tax can be deferred). 
(b) Under the classical system, there is a bias to avoid dividend distributions 
and instead retain earnings, thus avoiding the double tax. 
(c) Under the classical system, there is a bias in favor of capitalizing corpora-
tions with debt (producing deductible interest) rather than equity (produc-
ing non-deductible dividends). 
None of these reasons is completely convincing in the US context, which may be 
a reason why the US has maintained the classical system since 1936 (and indeed 
strengthened it in 1986 with the repeal of the "general utilities" doctrine, which 
enabled corporations to avoid corporate tax on appreciated assets). First, the 
alleged bias against the corporate form is mitigated by the excess of the individ-
ual rate over the corporate rate (although that excess is much lower now than it 
was before 1986, and is scheduled to disappear) and by the absence of strong pro-
visions to prevent retentions in the domestic context. In addition, under current 
rules, the classical system applies primarily to large, publicly traded corpora-
tions, while small, closely held businesses are able to avoid the double tax even if 
they are in corporate form for non-tax purposes. It is doubtful if there is sufficient 
substitutability between the two forms of business for the double tax to create 
much deadweight loss. The double tax is a price large businesses have to pay for 
access to the public equity markets and the liquidity that accompanies such 
access. Finally, to the extent that the corporate tax can be shifted to consumers or 
to labor, the bias disappears, and even the Treasury's 1991 integration study has 
suggested that considerable shifting can take place. (The bias reappears again if 
non-corporate businesses can likewise shift the individual tax burden, but it 
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seems plausible that the shifting potential of large multinationals is larger than 
that of small, closely held businesses.) 
Second, the bias in favor of retentions is mitigated by the ability of corporations 
to redeem shares from shareholders at the favorable capital gains rate, and by the 
fact that numerous shareholders are tax exempt or corporate (and thus do not pay 
a full tax on dividends). Indeed, even US corporations that used to pay dividends 
have now generally moved to structured redemption programs addressed to their 
taxable individual shareholders. Other corporations (especially high-tech ones) 
retain all their earnings, but it is not clear that this is primarily tax motivated (cor-
porations used to pay dividends under the same rules in the past). Finally, there is 
an unresolved debate among economists whether the dividend tax is capitalized 
into the price of the shares. If it is, then the retention bias applies only to new 
equity, but new equity is unlikely to pay dividends for non-tax reasons.5 
Third, the bias in favor of debt and against equity is a general problem of the 
income tax, which should not be addressed only in the corporate tax area. More-
over, to address it completely it is necessary to make dividends deductible, a form 
of integration that is never adopted (in part because it will automatically extend 
integration to foreign and tax-exempt shareholders). If integration takes the nor-
mal forms of imputation or dividend exemption, there is still a difference in treat-
ment between interest and dividends that can be manipulated. 
Finally, and most importantly for present purposes, all of these biases need to 
be offset by the countervailing biases created by integration in the international 
context. Two situations need to be considered: when the source country is inte-
grationist and the residence country classical, and when the source country is 
classical and the residence country integrationist. 
5.1. US as residence country 
If a US resident portfolio investor invests in shares of a company of an integra-
tionist country, the resulting bias depends on the form taken by integration. If the 
source country grants integration in the form of dividend exemption, the US 
investor would not benefit since the US would tax him on the dividend without 
allowing a foreign tax credit for underlying corporate taxes. A domestic source 
country investor would therefore be subject only to the corporate tax, while the 
US investor would be subject to the corporate tax, any withholding tax on divi-
dends, and the residual US tax. 
If the source country grants integration by way of imputation credits, the key 
issue is whether such credits are extended to foreign investors (by treaty or other-
wise). If (as is typical) the credits are not extended to foreigners, a domestic 
investor would only be subject to tax at his or her individual rate, while the US 
investor would be subject to tax at the corporate level, any withholding tax on 
dividends, and the residual US tax. Whether the combination of these taxes 
exceeds the source country tax on domestic investors depends on how high the 
944 
The burden would still fall on the shareholders when they sell their shares, but this is mitigated 
by deferral until sale and by the capital gains preference. 
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source country rates are (it is conceivable, for example, that the combined tax on 
the US investor of 60 in the example above would be matched by the single level 
source country tax on a domestic investor). 
If the imputation credits are extended to US investors, a different bias arises. 
In that case, both domestic and US investors in a foreign corporation would be 
taxed the same from the source country's perspective, except that the cost of 
imputation credits to US investors would be borne by the source country and any 
tax on the dividend collected by the US. From a US perspective, however, there 
would be a bias in favor of investing in source country corporations and against 
investing in US corporations, since only dividends from the former would carry 
the imputation credits. Such a bias would not be eliminated by the US taxing the 
dividends in full, since the investor would still receive an imputation credit check 
from the source country treasury. 
5.2. US as source country 
If the foreign residence country grants integration by way of dividend exemption, 
presumably the exemption would apply to dividends from US as well as from 
domestic corporations. 6 In that case, a bias is created in favor of foreign investors 
in US companies, since they would be exempt from tax on the dividend (unless a 
US withholding tax applies, but such taxes are reduced by treaty or avoided). A 
US domestic investor would be taxable on the dividends in full. 
If the foreign country grants integration by way of imputation credits, there 
will be no credits available for an investor who invests directly in a US company. 
In that case, there will be a bias in favor of investing in domestic corporations. 
This bias may be partially eliminated if credit is given for US taxes to a domestic 
portfolio investor in a domestic company with US source income. But that would 
create a bias in favor of foreign investors in such companies over US investors in 
a domestic US corporation. 
6. Conclusion and recommendation 
In general, there seems to be no reason to assume that the biases created by inte-
gration from an international perspective are less important than the biases cre-
ated by the classical system from a domestic perspective. In fact, the former may 
be gaining in importance as cross-border investment grows, while there are rea-
sons to doubt the importance of the latter. This may be the reason why many 
countries (e.g. Japan, Germany and the UK) have recently been abolishing or 
restricting integration. If the whole world reverted to the classical system, the 
international biases would be eliminated.7 
This is true for many dividend exemption countries but not for others. 
The biases may also be eliminated if all countries adopted integration in similar ways. However, 
under current imputation systems, domestic investment in local companies is generally favored 
945 
UNITED STATES 
Nevertheless, in the foreseeable future, some countries will continue to grant 
integration, while others (including the US) are likely to maintain a classical sys-
tem. In that situation, it is necessary to make a choice between the international 
biases described above, which is similar to the choice between capital import 
neutrality (treating all investors in the source country alike) and capital export 
neutrality (treating all investment opportunities to a resident investor alike). 
Since most of the empirical evidence continues to suggest that the elasticity of 
the demand for capital is greater than the elasticity of the supply of capital, most 
economists would support a continued preference for capital export neutrality 
(neutrality in the allocation of investments) over capital import neutrality (neu-
trality in the allocation of savings). 
If one prefers capital export neutrality, this suggests that integrationist source 
countries should not extend integration benefits to foreign investors (since that 
would violate CEN while maintaining CIN). This is consistent with current prac-
tice. When the integrationist country is the residence country, integration benefits 
should be extended to investments in classical source countries. This can be done 
by granting integration credits for taxes paid to the source country, either through 
a domestic corporation (which is common) or even through a foreign corporation 
(less common but possible - it is equivalent to granting the indirect foreign tax 
credit to portfolio US investors, which would raise many difficult administrative 
issues). A simpler solution, however, is to exempt dividends from both domestic 
and foreign corporations. This would still leave a possible bias in the form of a 
dividend withholding tax imposed by the source country (plus a branch profits 
tax if the investment is through a foreign corporation), but in the case of the US 
portfolio investors can usually avoid the dividend withholding tax. 
I would thus recommend that integrationist countries adopt a dividend exemp-
tion method of integration, and apply it to both domestic and foreign source div-
idends. 8 As far as the US is concerned, I would recommend abolishing the 
dividend withholding tax and the branch profits tax. This would violate CIN but 
would retain CEN, since the double tax would continue to apply to foreign 
investors from classical countries but only the corporate tax would apply to for-
eign investors from integration countries with a dividend exemption in place. 
cont. 
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and inbound and outbound investment discouraged (although ordering rules for distributions 
may mitigate this bias). This situation may persist even if all countries adopted integration. In 
addition, the current trend seems to be toward abandoning integration rather than adopting it. 
An alternative solution would be for countries to tax corporate profits and dividends each at 
about half the top personal tax rate. The tax on corporate source income would therefore be 
equal to the personal tax but collected in two pieces, one piece when the income is earned and 
the other when it is distributed. The source country would tax the profits and the residence coun-
try the dividends. This would, however, require a higher degree of cooperation than the solution 
proposed in the text. 
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Resume 
Les Etats-Unis possedent un systeme fiscal classique pour !'imposition des societes et de 
leurs associes; c'est-a-dire que le revenu est impose au niveau de la societe tandis que les 
associes sont imposes sur les dividendes, sans exemption ni credit pour les imp6ts sur les 
societes payes. La double imposition est quelque peu attenuee par un taux d'imp6t preferen-
tiel sur les gains en capital a long terme, qui est egalement applicable a de nombreux rachats 
de societes. Ce regime est egalement etendu a l'echelle internationale. Les Etats-Unis 
imposent !es societes nationales sur leur revenu et perc,oivent une retenue a la source de 
30 pour cent (reductible par convention a 5 pour cent pour les investisseurs directs et a 
15 pour cent pour les investisseurs en portefeuille) sur les dividendes payes aux actionnaires 
etrangers. Neanmoins, !es gains en capital des investisseurs etrangers (investissement en 
portefeuille ou direct) ne sont pas imposes. Les Etats-Unis imposent egalement les societes 
etrangeres sur le revenu de leurs succursales aux Etats-Unis et grevent d'un imp6t sur les 
benefices des succursales les benefices generes par une succursale nationale. En tant que 
pays de la residence, Jes Etats-Unis imposent Jes dividendes payes tant aux investisseurs 
directs qu'aux investisseurs en portefeuille dans des societes etrangeres, et ont des regles 
tres precises pour empecher la retention de revenus etrangers a taux fiscal privilegie. Les 
retenues a la source perc,ues par des pays de la source etrangers sont generalement imputa-
bles; toutefois, seuls Jes investisseurs directs dans une societe peuvent imputer les imp6ts 
d'une societe sous-jacents. Ce regime etablit generalement la neutralite entre les investis-
seurs etrangers et nationaux (les uns et les autres sont assujettis a la double imposition, sauf 
sur les gains en capital) mais cree des desequilibres lorsqu'un resident des Etats-Unis 
investit dans un pays integrationniste ou qu'un investisseur etranger originaire d'un pays 
integrationniste investit aux Etats-Unis. Le rapport recommande d'attenuer quelques-uns de 
ces desequilibres en demandant au pays integrationniste etranger d'exempter Jes dividendes 
en provenance de societes des Etats-Unis, et aux Etats-Unis de supprimer sa retenue a la 
source sur Jes dividendes et l'imp6t sur les benefices des succursales. Aucun changement 
n'est recommande pour le traitement classique en vigueur d'un investisseur des Etats-Unis 
dans un pays integrationniste. 
D'une maniere generale, les Etats-Unis ont un systeme d'imposition classique pour Jes 
societes et leurs associes, quelque peu attenue par un taux d'imposition preferentiel pour les 1 
gains en capital. Le systeme classique est egalement applicable aux investisseurs etrangers 
dans des societes et entreprises des Etats-Unis, et aux investisseurs des Etats-Unis dans des 
societes etrangeres. 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Vereinigten Staaten haben ein klassisches Steuersystem fiir die Besteuerung von Kor-
perschaften und ihren Gesellschaftern, d.h. Einkommen der Korperschaft wird auf der 
Ebene der Korperschaft besteuert und Gesellschafter werden in Bezug auf Dividenden 
besteuert, ohne Befreiung oder Anrechnung gezahlter Korperschaftssteuern. Die Dop-
pelbesteuerung wird zum Tei! gemildert <lurch einen Vorzugssteuersatz fiir langfristige 
Kapitalgewinne, der auch fiir zahlreiche Aktieneinziehungen gilt. Dieses System wird auch 
auf internationale Verhaltnisse angewandt. Die USA besteuern ihre inlandischen Korper-
schaften mit ihrem Einkommen und erheben eine Quellensteuer von 30 Prozent (<lurch 
Abkommen auf 5 Prozent fiir Direktanleger und 15 Prozent fiir Portfolio-Anleger reduzier-
bar) auf Dividenden, die an auslandische Gesellschafter gezahlt werden. Es gibt jedoch 
947 
UNITED STATES 
keine Kapitalgewinnsteuer ftir auslandische Anleger (Portfolio- oder Direktanleger). Die 
USA besteuern ferner ausliindische Korperschaften in Bezug auf das Einkommen ihrer 
Niederlassungen in den USA und erheben eine Niederlassungsgewinnsteuer auf Gewinne. 
die von einer inliindischen Niederlassung abgezogen werden. Als Wohnsitzland besteuern 
die USA Dividenden, die sowohl an Direkt- als auch an Portfolio-Anleger in ausliindischen 
Korperschaften gezahlt werden, und es gibt ausgefeilte Vorschriften, um eine Nichtaus-
schtittung niedrig besteuerter ausliindischer Ertriige zu verhindem. Im Ausland erhobene 
Quellensteuern sind im Allgemeinen anrechenbar, doch konnen nur Korperschaften in 
ihrer Eigenschaft als Direktanleger die Anrechnung gezahlter Ki:irperschaftssteuern in 
Anspruch nehmen. Das System ist im Allgemeinen in Bezug auf ausliindische und 
inliindische Anleger neutral (beide unterliegen der Doppelbesteuerung, ausgenommen auf 
Kapitalgewinne), bewirkt aber Verzerrungen, wenn ein Ansiissiger in den USA in einem 
Land mit Integrationsbesteuerung investiert oder ein Auslander aus einem Land mit Inte-
grationsbesteuerung in den USA investiert. Der Bericht empfiehlt, einige dieser Verzerrun-
gen dadurch zu beseitigen, dass das Land mit einer lntegrationsbesteuerung Dividenden 
einer US-Korperschaft von der Steuer befreit und die USA ihre Quellensteuer auf Dividen-
den sowie die Niederlassungsgewinnsteuer abschaffen. In Bezug auf die derzeitige klassi-
sche Behandlung eines US-Anlegers in einem Land mit Integrationsbesteuerung wird 
keine Anderung empfohlen. 
Im allgemeinen haben die Vereinigten Staaten ein klassisches Steuersystem fiir Ki:irper-
schaften und Gesellschafter, das zum Tei! <lurch einen Vorzugssteuersatz ftir Kapital-
gewinne gemildert wird. Das klassische System gilt auch ftir ausliindische Anleger in 
US-Ki:irperschaften und US-Unternehmen sowie ftir US-Anleger in ausliindischen Korper-
schaften. 
Resumen 
EEUU tiene un sistema tributario clasico en lo que se refiere al gravamen de las sociedades 
y sus accionistas, es decir, la renta tributa a nivel de la sociedad y los accionistas tributan 
por los dividendos, sin exenci6n ni credito fiscal por los impuestos pagados. La doble 
imposici6n se ve algo atenuada por un tipo impositivo preferente sobre las plusvalfas a 
largo plazo, y que es tambien aplicable a muchas recompras de sociedades. Este regimen 
se extiende a escala internacional. EEUU grava la renta de las sociedades nacionales, y 
establece una retenci6n en la fuente de! 30 por ciento (reducible por convenio al 5 por 
ciento para inversores directos y al 15 por ciento para los de cartera) sobre los dividendos 
pagados a los accionistas extranjeros. No tributan las plusvalias de inversores extranjeros 
(inversiones de cartera o directos). EEUU grava tambien la renta de las sucursales en el 
pafs de sociedades extranjeras y los beneficios generados por una sucursal nacional. Como 
pais de residencia, EEUU grava los dividendos pagados a inversores directos y de cartera 
de sociedades extranjeras, y cuenta con reglas muy precisas para impedir la retenci6n a 
tipos privilegiados de rentas extranjeras. Son genera!mente imputables las retenciones en 
la fuente de pafses de! extranjero; no obstante, unicamente los inversores directos de una 
sociedad pueden imputar los tributos sociales subyacentes. Este regimen es, en general, 
neutral respecto de inversores nacionales y extranjeros (unos y otros sujetos a doble 
imposici6n, salvo en plusvalias), pero crea desequilibrios cuando un residente de EEUU 
invierte en un pais integracionista o viceversa. La ponencia recomienda atenuar algunos 
desequilibrios demandando al pafs integracionista extranjero, exima los dividendos proce-
dentes de sociedades de EEUU y a los EEUU suprima su retenci6n en la fuente sobre los 
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dividendos y al impuesto sobre beneficios de sucursales. No se recomienda ninglin cambio 
del tratamiento clasico vigente para inversores de EEUU en un pafs integracionista. En 
general, EEUU tiene su sistema tributario clasico sobre sociedades y sus accionistas, algo 
atenuado por un tipo impositivo preferente sobre las plusvalfas, sistema que es tambien 
aplicable a los inversores extranjeros de sociedades y empresas de EEUU y a los inver-
sores nacionales en sociedades extranjeras. 
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